Commonwealth of Virginia v. Mary R. White by unknown
I t-7 9 6' -
l'tD -I~? 
Record No. 2621 
In The 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
At Richmond 
' COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
v. 
MARY R. WHITE 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 
RULE NO. 14. 
1f 5. NUMBER OF COPIES TO BE FILED AND DELIVERED TO OP· 
POSING COUNSEL. Twenty copies of each brief shall be filed with 
the clerk of the court, and at least two copies mailed or deliver-
ed to opposing counsel on or before the day on which the brief 
is filed. 
,r 6. SIZE AND TYPE. Briefs shall be printed in type not less 
in size than small pica, and shall be nine inches in length and 
six inches in width, so as to conform in dimensions to the print-
ed records. The record number of the case shall be printed 
on all briefs. 
The foregoing is pl'inted in small pica type for the informa· 
tion of counsel. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Court opens at 9 :30 a. m. ; Adjourns at 1 :00 p. m. 
OA.HPP'IELO PKINTJNO CO., STAUNTON, VA. 
/ 
CLERK 
SUPREME COURT Of APPFM.S 
EC:EJVE 




INDEX TO PETITION 
(Record No. 2621) 
Assignments of Errors ................ . 
Jurisdiction of the Court .............. . 
Fltcts ............................... . 
Statutes involved ..................... . 
Position of the Applicant ............. . 
Position of the Commonwealth ......... . 
Argument ...... · ..................... . 
The Indebtedness of the Company to 
Applicant is Taxable to her Under the 
Provisions of Section 69 of the Tax Code 
of Virginia ........................ . 
Commonwealth v. Stringfello-w 173 Va. 
284, Distinguisl1ed ............... . 
Conclusion .......................... . 
Prayer .............................. . 
Statement required by Rule 9 ........... . 
Oral hearing requested on petition ..... . 
















Cohen and Winston v. Walford, l.11 Va. 812 3* 
Colonial Beach v. DeAtley, 154 Va. 451, 457 3* 
Commonwealth v. 8trin,qfelloio, 173 Va. 284 ...... 5,6,8,13,15* 
Richmond Food Stores v. Richmiond, 177 
Va. 592, 596 ....................... . 
Schermerhorn v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. 
707, 709 ........................... . 






Oode of Virginia, Section 6336 . . . . . . . . . . 3* 
Code of Virginia, Section 6337 . . . . . . . . . . 3* 
Oonstitution, of Virginia, Section 168 . . . . 9* 
Ta{]) Code of Virg-inia, Section 09 ........ 2,5,6,7,9,11,13,14,15* 
Ta{]) Code of Vitrgi.nia Section 70 . . . . . . . . 5,6,7,8,9,12,13,15* 
IN THE 
Supreme- Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
vs. 
MARY R. WHITE 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR ON BEHALF OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
( Italics supplied unless otherwise indicated) 
To the Honorable Chief J ustioe and the Associate Justices of 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, the Commonwealth of Virginia, acting here-
in by the State Tax Commissioner, who is the proper officer 
designated by law to represent the Commonwealth in 
2* sucli. matters, respectfully represents that on the *2nd 
day of August, 1941, Mary R. White, a resident of 
Albemarle County, Virginia, instituted in the Circuit Court 
of Albemarle County a certain proceeding at law against your 
petitioner for exoneration from certain State taxes on in-
tangible personal property assessed against the said Mary R. 
White, whereupon such proveedings were had therein that, 
on the 2nd day of January, 1942, a :final judgment was rendered 
against your petitioner, and a transcript of the. record in said 
suit and of the judgment therein is herewith exhibited. 
Your petitioner is advised and represents unto Your Honors 
that the said judgment is erroneous and that it is aggrieved 
thereby in the following particulars, namely: 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS 
1. 
The court erred in holding that Mary R. White was not 
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subject to th~ State property tax imposed by section 69 of the 
Ta:c Oode of Virginia on account of the indebtedness to her 
of the F. S. Royster Guano Company as of January 1, 1940. 
2. 
The court erred in exonerating Mary R. White from the 
State r,rffpertv tax assessed her by the State Depart-
3* ment of Taxation for the tax year * 1940 in the amount 
of $71..94. 
Both assignments of error involve the same question of law 
and, therefore, they will be argued together. 
,IBRISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The amount of State taxes involved in this particular case 
is only $71.94. However, the construction of a State statute 
impo~ing _a tax. i~ directly involved in the final judgment herein, 
thus drawing in question a "matter not merely pecuniary." 
Therefore, your petitioner is not precluded from seeking a 
writ of error by _the amount of the tax. See sections 6336 and 
6337 of the Code of Virginia. 
. There· is no controversy here as to the amount of the tax, 
the only question decided by the court below being the autho-
rity of the State tax authorities to assess the challenged tax 
under section 69 of the Ta:c Oode properly construed. That this 
court has juri_sdiction in such a case is well settled by its prior 
decisions. Sta-unto-n v. Stout, 86 Va. 321, 322; Schermerhorn 
v. Oommomvealth, 107 Va. 707, 709; Oohen and Winston v. 
Walford, 111 Va. 812; OoZonial Beach v. De.A.tley, 154 Va. 451, 
457. . 
*FACTS 
The facts are:_ contained in a stipulation agreed to by counsel 
(Tr. pp. 7-12), but for·convenience they are summarized below. 
Mrs. Mary R. White ( hereinafter referred to as the appli-
cant), a resident of Albemarle County, Virginia, and ~ stock-
. holder in the F. S. Royster Guano Company- (hereinafter refer-
11ed to as the company), a Virginia corporation manufacturing 
fertilizers, with its principal office in Norfolk, made an oral 
agreement ( 1) with the compllD.y whereby the dividends on 
her stock were not remitted to her but were retained by the 
company, the applicant being paid the same rate of interest 
on the average monthly indebtedness of the company to her as 
NOTE 1. The company would make similar agreements with 
others of its stockholders who so desired. 
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was paid by the company to banks from which it borrowed 
money. The rate of interest varied, in some years amounting 
to four and one-half per centum, and in two years ( 1933 and 
1935), when the company borrowed no money from banks, no 
interest was paid. Under the agreement the company, at all 
times solvent, could and would pay its indebtedness to appli· 
cant at any time ; and upon request would mail its check to 
applicant, or to others for her account, in the amount desired, 
nine such checks (:five to applicant and four to others) being 
issued in the year 1939. The applicant has never held the 
5* *company's note or bond or other evidence of indebted-
ness other than annual statements of her account (Ex-
hibit A) and written notifications to her when d i,idends were 
declared and retained by the company under the agreement. 
The entire indebtedness of the company to applicant as of 
January 1, 1940, consisted of dividends lef~ by applicant with 
the company, and applicant has never made any deposit. of 
money or checks or in any other form with the company, nor 
has applicant ever drawn any checks on the company. 
The company is not authorized by its charter to do, and 
has never done, a banking business. 
On January 1, 1940, the indebtedness of the company to 
applicant, as disclosed by its books, was $23,980.11. In filing 
her State tax return of intangible -personal nroperty for the 
tax year 1940 applicant reported the indebtedness of the 
company to her under the classification of "money" taxable 
under section 70 of the Tam Oode of Virginia at 20 cents per 
one hundred dollars, citing as authority therefor the case of 
Oorwmonwealth v. Stringfellow, 173 Va. 284-. When the return 
was audited in regular course by the State Department of 
Taxation the applicant was advised that the said indebtedness 
had been erroneously reported as "money" and tl1iA.L :~ '3:i.vuld 
have been reported as taxable under section 69 of the Tam Code 
and taxed at the rate of 50 cents per one hundred dollars, and 
applicant was, therefore, assessed by the said Depart-
6* ment with *an additional assessment of $71.94, which 
assessment has not been paid .. 
The State Tax Commissioner, as the chief executive officer 
of the Department of Taxation, has uniformly ruled since lie 
was appointed to this office in 1.926 tJiat an indebtedness of a 
corporation to its officers or stockholders, such a9 1~ herein 
described, is subject to State taxation under section 69 of the 
. Ta(l) Gode of V ir,qinia, and wherever the Commissioner has had 
or secured information concerning tlle existence of ~1wh an 
indebtedness, if it has not been so reported for taxation, the 
Commissioner has caused the said indebtedness to be assessed 
for taxation under the said section 69 of the Tam Code. The 
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said Commissioner personally considered and dil'ected to be 
made the assessment involved in this proceeding. Since the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Appe.als of Virginia in Com-
monwealth v. Stringfelloiv, 173 Va. 284, the State Tax Com-
missioner has ruled that credit balances owed by stock brokers 
to their customers on rTanuary 1 of any year are taxable to suc1i 
customers under section 70 of the Ta{J) Code of V vrguiia. 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
The statutes primarily involved are sections 69 and 70 of the 
Ta{J) Oo<le of Virginia. The pertinent portions are set out below: 
7* *"Se~. 69. Bonds, notes, other evidences of debt, 
demands and claims, secured or not secured. All bonds 
( except bonds of the United States, bonds of the State of 
Virginia, and bonds of counties, cities and towns or other 
political subdivisions of this State), notes and other evidences 
of debt, including bonds of other States than Virginia, bonds 
of counties, cities and towns located outside of the State of 
Virginia, bonds of railroad and canal companies and other 
corporations, bonds of individuals and all demands and claims, 
however evidenced, whetl1er secured by mortgage, deed of trust, 
judgment or otherwise, or not so secured; provided, however, 
that no property taxable under any other section of this chap-
ter shall be taxable under this section. 
''On all property defined by this section there is hereby 
annually levied a tax of fifty cents on every one hundred dol-
lars of the fair market value thereof. 
* * * * 
"Sec. 70. Money.-All money ( except money which is 
otherwise taxed) on deposit with any bank or other corpora-
tion or firm or person doing a banking business, or such part 
of tlle proceeds of any life insurance policy as are retained by 
the life insurance company at the request of the beneficiary of 
such policy, after the death of the insured, or money in the 
possession or under control of the owner, whether such money 
be actually in or out of this State and belonging to a resident 
of this State, ,vhich shall include certificates of deposit of any 
bank, banking association, trust or security company or par-
tial payment deposits made with industrial loan associations 
for the purchase of income bonds, certificates of investment 
or investment bonds, bearing a total interest rate paid or to 
be paid not exceeding five per centum per annum ; all money 
under the control of a court receiver or commissioner in pur-
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su3:nce of an order, judgment or decree of any court or in the 
hands_ or under the control of an executor, administrator, 
guardian, trustee, agent, or other :fiduciary; and all money 
deposited to the credit of any suit, not in the hands of a receiver 
or other fiduciary. 
8* *"On all money as defined by this section there is 
hereby annually levied a tax of twenty cents on every 
one hundred dollars of the actual value thereof. 
* * * * * 
POSITION OF THE APPLICANT 
The applicant contends, and the court below so held, that 
this case is controlled by the decision of this court in Oonvmon-
wealth v. Stringfellow, 173 Va. 284, and that, therefore, the 
indebtedness of the company to her as of January 1, 1940, is 
taxable as money under section 70 of the Ta:JJ Oode of Vvrginia 
at the rate of 20 cents per one hundred dollars. Under date of 
December 16, 1941, the learned judge of the court below ad-
dressed a letter to counsel for the respective parties which 
reads as follows (2) : 
"This Court is of the opinion that the prayer of the petition 
should be granted and the assessment corrected as erroneous . 
. "The arguments of counsel have been considered and the 
decision in Oom. v. Strin,qfellow, 173 Va. 284 considered with 
the greatest of care. This court does not find that it can differen-
tiate the case presented by the petition from the Stringfellow 
case. Having reached this conclusion, the above decision is 
binding and decisive." 
9* *POSITION OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
The Commonwealth contends that the indebtedness in ques-
tion is taxable to applicant at the rate of 50 cents per one 
hundred dollars under section 69 of the Ta{J) Oode of Virginia 
as "bonds, * * notes and other evidences of debt, * * and an· 
demands and claims * *.,, It is further contended by the Com-
monwealth that the indebtedness is embraced within the plain 
language of section 69 and, therefore, must be taxed ul"ilP~ the 
NOTE 2. Inasmuch as this letter was by the final order in 
the case made a part of the record ( Tr. p. 14), but inadvertently 
omitted in m~king up the transcript of the record, cou.u.~~l for 
the Commonwealth feel that the contents of the letter should 
be made available to the court for its information. 
(j Sup1·eme Court of Appe~ls of Virginia 
said section in order to comply with the mandate of section 
168 of the Constitution that "all ·properly, except as hereinafter 
provided, shall he taxed * * ," since the indebtedness cannot 
be taxed under section 70 of the Tam Code as "money * * on 
deposit with any bank or other corporation * * doing a bank-
ing business * * ," for the reason that the indebtedness is not 
"money on deposit" but a commercial loan in the nature of an 
investment. and for the further reason that the company "is 
not authorized * * to do, and never has done, a banking busi-
ness." 
The Commonwealth also contends that the facts in the 
instant case so clearly distinguish it from the Stringfellow 
case that the Stringfellow case is not here controlling, and 
that its doctrine, the decision being on the borderline, should 
not be extended so as to embrace the different situation here 
presented. 
10* *ARGUMENT 
The Indebtedness of the Company to Applicant is Taxable 
to her Under the Provisions of Section 69 of the Tax Code of 
· Virginia. 
The agreed facts disclose an ordinary demand loan of 
money by the applicant to the·company. No other interpreta-
tion can be placed UJ)On the transaction between them. Under 
the agreement the applicant, like the average lender, receives 
compensation ( interest in some years amoW1ting to as much 
as four and one-half per centum) for the use of the money she 
loans th~ company, and the company in turn receives the bene-
fit of the money in carrying on its manufacturing business and 
is thus enabled to reduce its bank borrowings to the extent 
that it borrows from applicant. The fact that the loan is pay-
able by the borrower on demand does not alter the legal effect 
of the transaction, nor is there anything unusual about a 
demand loan to a manufacturing corporation, for, as the court 
judicially knows, it is a common business practice for a bank 
to make demand loans to a solvent manufacturing corporation 
engaged. in a seasonal business and with an established line of 
credit. · 
It is submitted· that as a practical matter what the appli-
cant has done is, .instead of taking her dividends in cash, 
11 * *she has invested them in an interest-bearing loan to 
the company. Such an investment for tax pJJ.rposes comes 
not only within the letter but also within the spirit of section 
69 of the Ta(!) Code imposing a tax on "all bonds* * notes and 
other evidences of debt, * * and all demands and claims, * *." 
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It would be unsound to argue that to be taxable under sec-
tion 69 applicant should have taken a note from the company. 
Such a contention simply ignores realities. Valµes are taxed-
not pieces of paper and that is the reason why "a~l demands 
and claims" -were included in the taxing statute. Let us sup-
pose, for example, that another stockholder made exactly the 
same agreement with the company as did applicant except 
that the second stockholder took a non-negotiable demand note. 
Surely it would not be denied that the second stockholder 
would be taxable under section 69. Thus, if, the mere taking 
of a note is to be the sole test of taxability, the result would 
be that one stockholder would be taxed under section 69 and 
the other stockholder, with a contract identical in all respects, 
would not be so taxed? Such a result, it is submitted, simply 
does not make sense, and it is fundamental that statutes if 
possible, are to be so construed as to accomplish a reasonable 
result, and such a construction is certainly possible in the 
case of the statute here involved. As this court said in the 
Stringfellow case, "logic at times gives way to common 
sense." 
12* *Section 70 of the Tax Code imposing a tax on money 
clearly does not include applicant's loan to the com-
pany. That section so far as it is pertinent here only includes 
"all money * * on deposit with any bank or other corporation 
or form or person doing a bankin,q business**." The company's 
business-manufacturing fertilizer-is about as different from 
the banking business as it is possible to imagine, and further-
more it is stipulated that it "is not authorized by its charter 
to do, and never has done, a banking business." Certainly it 
cannot be said, therefore, that section 70 literally construed 
taxes applicant's loan to the company. 
Nor is the loan taxed by section 70 when that statute is 
interpreted in accordance with its true purpose and intent. 
Laying aside the question of whether the company is engaged 
in the banking business, the section is intended to tax exactly 
what it says-"money on deposit." Applicant has deposited 
nothing with the company-she has simply loaned it at in-
terest the dividends which t1ie company would otherwise have 
to pay her in cash. She has invested her money in this loan. 
It is stipulated ( Tr. p. 10) that the entire indebtedness of the 
company to applicant consisted of these dividends and that 
she "has never made any deposit of money or checks or i,n any 
other fonn with the com,pany * *." Applicant has no more 
made any deposit of· money with the company than has any 
other person who loans money at interest. 
13* *The Commonwealth submits, therefore, that appli-
cant's loan to the company is taxable under both the 
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letter aiid spirit of section 69 of the Tam Code and is not tax-
able under either the letter or the spirit of section 70 thereof. 
Oommonioealth v. Stri1i,clfe1.low, 
173 Va. 284, Distinguished. 
In the above case Mr. Stringfellow for many years maintain-
ed an open account with his stockbrocker. This account con-
sisted of money deposited., proceeds from the sale of securities 
and collections made for Mr. Stringfellow by his broker, such 
as dividends, interest coupons, etc. No interest was paid by the 
broker, and the funds were held primarily for investment in 
securities at Mr. Stringfellow's direction. At one time the 
broker had been authorized to do a banking business and, as 
was stated in the opinion, in speaking of the broker "much 
that they do· is in the nature of a banking business." Further-
more, the court found that Mr. Stringfellow "had long paid" 
a tax on the open account as money "apparently without ob-
jection on the part of our taxing authorities." 
The facts in the Stringfellow case are in sharp contrast 
with those in the case at bar. Applicant makes no deposits of 
any kind with the company; the entire indebtedness of the 
company to her consists of dividends on her stock therein, 
which dividends she loans to the company and for which 
14* she is paid '*'regular interest. The com1)any is not hold-
. ing her funds for investment-they have already been 
invested by her in the loan. The company does not, as was the 
case with Mr. Stringfellow's broker, act as applicant's agent 
in collecting interest and dividends and in investing her funds. 
In the Stringfellow case the broker was engaged in the "money 
business" so to speak, while the company here is a manufactur-
ing corporation borrowing funds from applicant. 
The court thought that no consistent administrative prac-
tice on the part of the taxing authorities was shown in the 
Stringfellow case, while here the stipulation sets out a con-
sistent, long continued administrative practice to tax under 
section 69 of the Tam Gode a loan of the character made by 
applicant to the company. Indeed the State Tax Commissioner, 
whose views this court has very recently said in IUchmond 
Food Stores v. Riclunond, 177 Va. 592, 596, ''are entitled to 
_the same careful consideration we would accord to any recog-
nized text-writer upon a given subject," evidently thought that 
the Stringfellow case was clearly distinguishable from the 
case at bar for he "personally considered and directed to be 
made the ass~ssment involved in this proceeding." . 
It is with much deference submitted that the court recog-
nized in its opinion that the decision Jn the Stringfellow case 
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that the open account there involed was taxable under 
15* *section 70 was on the border line on account of the 
fact that it realized that Scott & Stringfellow were 
teohnicalltJJ not engaged in the banking business. The court 
also felt, however, that considering the substance of the matter 
Mr. Stringfellow's oven account with his broker was in reality 
''money on deposit" and should be taxed as such. That this 
is the proper interpetation of the opinion is manifest from the 
following from the concluding paragraph thereof: 
" * * But when we remember it wa~ the purpose of the 
Constitution to have the Legislature assess all property for 
taxation and that this under review is really money on deposit, 
to tax it as such seems to be fair- and just; and this would 
appear to be the best solution of a somewhat awkward situa-
tion. Certainly we are safe in assuming that there was no 
-1egislative intent to relieve it in its entirety. * *" (173 Va. 284, 
292). 
Here, however, there is no "awkward situation" to solve. 
The property of the class under review is not "really money on 
deposit," and should not be taxed as such, but is money loaned 
out at interest which should be, ·as it. uniformly has been, taxed 
under section 69 of the Ta{J) Oode. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated it is respectfully submitted that the 
·assessment of tax made against applicant by the State Depart-
ment of Taxation is clearly correct and that, therefore, 
16* *the decision of the court below should be reversed. 
PRAYER 
Your petitioner, therefore, prays that a writ of error and 
supersedeas may be awarded it, in order that such judgment, 
for the causes of _error aforesaid, before you may be caused to 
come, that the whole matter in the said judgment contained 
may be reheard, and that the said judgment may be reversed 
and annulled. 
STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE 9 
Counsel for the Commonwealth of Virginia stflt.P th!l.t a 
copy o.f this petition was on the 29th day of April, 1942, mailed 
to op~osing counsel in the trial court, and that this petition 
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was filed on the 29th day of April, 1942, with the Clerk of this 
Court at Richmond, and, further, that should a writ of error 
be awarded, this petition is adopted as the opening brief on 
behalf of the Commonwealth. 
ORAL HEARING REQUESTED ON PETITION 
Counsel for the Commonwealth of Virginia desire to state 
orally the reasons for reviewing the decision complained of, 
and respectfully request that an opportunity be afforded 
therefor. 
17* *Respectfully submitted, 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGCTIA, 
at the relation of the State Tax Commissioner, 
By: ABRAM P. STAPLES, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
April 29, 1942. 
. Attorney General. 
W. W. MARTIN, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
I, W. W. Martin, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that in my 
opinion tl1ere is error in the judgment entered on the 2nd day 
of January, 1942, in the Circuit Court of Albemarle County, 
in favor of Mary R. White, as set forth in the foregoing peti-
tion, for which the same should be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia. · 
W. W. MARTIN. 
Received April 29, 1942. 
M. B. WATTS; Clerk.. 
June 2, 1942. Writ of error and supersedeas awarded. No 
bond. · 
M. B. W. 
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.RECORD. 
VIRGINIA: 
In the Circuit Court of Albemarle County, August 2, 1941 
MA.RY R. WHITE ................ ~ . . . . . . . . . . . Petitioner 
·v. Petition for Correction 
of Erroneous Assess-
ment of State Taxes 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ............ Defendant 
To the Honorable Lemuel F. Smith, Judge of the Oowrt afore-
said: 
Your Petitioner, Mary R. Wl1ite, respectfully represents 
that she is aggrieved by the assessment of omitted 
additional State taxes on intangible personal property for the 
year 1940 made against her by the Department of Taxation of 
the Commonwealth of Virginia, and that she is entitled to 
have said assessment corrected. In support of her petition your 
Petitioner shows unto the Court the following facts. 
First. That your Petitioner is and has been during the 
entire period involved in this petition a resident of Albemarle 
County, State of Virginia. 
Second. That during said ·period your Petitioner was a 
stockholder in the corporation known as F. S. Royster Guano 
Company whose principal office is in Norfolk, Virginia. Said 
company is engaged in the business of manufacturing and sell-
ing chemicals and chemical fertilizers, and was c::1 J =i::iry 
1st., 1940, indebted to your petitioner for a balance to Peti-
tioner's credit in the sum of $23,980.11. The said credit balance 
represented dividends of said company returned to it by the 
Petitioner and/ or credited by said company to Petitioner's 
account. . 
Third. That the said F. S. Royster Guano Company was at 
the times herein mentioned and is now solvent and 
page 2 }ready, willing and able to pay to your Petitioner 
upon her demand her entire credit balance. Acco-rcling 
to the custom of dealing between your Petitioner and said F. S. 
Royster Guano Company your Petitioner could and did, when 
in need of funds notify said company, whereupon a: check was 
promptly supplied to her for the amount required; or upon 
Petitioner's requests company checks would be sent to others, 
and her account debited with the amount of such checks. That 
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the following is a stat~ment of her transactions anil account 
with said company during the year 1939 evidencing the balance 
on hand ,January 1st., 1940 (same balance as shown December 
31st., 1939) : 
N orfon:, Va., Dec. 31, 1939. 
Mrs. Mary R. White 
Transactions· for year 1939 
In Account With F. S. Royster Guano Co. 
1939 CREDITS DR. CR. 
Jan. 3 By check from you (Returning 
bal. of 1938 a/c sent you by us 
-Balance 1/3/39 · .......... . 
Jan. 11 By dividend ............... . 
July 14 By dividend ................ . 
DEBITS 
Mar. 7 Cash ....................... $ 2,000.00 
Apr. 13 Cash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,300.00 
May 6 Cash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,000.00 
June 15 Cash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,950.00 
Aug. 17 Check to C. L. Lewis . . . . . . . . 8,968.54 
Aug. 17 Check to Marshall Wells . . . . . . 100.00 
Aug. 30 Check to Bailey & Hastings 
Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 665.54 
Aug. 30 Check to Sthn. Desk Co. . . . . . 1,550.00 
Sept. 19 Cash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,000.00 
Dec. -31 By int. 11/2% on average 
balance 1.939 •.••.••..••••..• 







NOTE: Debits marked "Cash" were checks to Petitioner. 
Other debits check sent at Petitioner's request. 
Fourth. That Petitioner duly filed with the Director of 
Finance of Albemarle County on or 1wior to June 1, 1940, her 
tax return on "Form 750, Department of Taxation." That 
under that portion of the return entitled "MONEY" 
page 3 ~your Petitioner returned tl1e amount which she had 
on deposit in banks and returned her deposit wit;ti 
the said F. S. Royster Guano Company in the following words 
and figures, to-wit: "On deposit with F. S. Royster Co., Nor-
folk, Va., and returned under this. head under authority of 
Comm. v. Stringfellow, 173 Va. 284, $23,980.11." 
That thereafter the said deposit was assessed for taxation at 
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the rate ·of 20c on every $100 thereof and that on October 10, 
1940, your Petitioner, paid the tax thereon to,i:ether with other 
taxes, to H. A. Haden, Director of Finance, Albemarle County, 
Virginia. · · 
Fifth. That subsequentlv tlie Depart111ent of Taxation ad-
vised your Petiti.oner that'the aforesaid credit balance had been 
erroneously returned by her as money and that said balance 
should have been assessed as "bond, etc." and th.at under date 
of February 14th., 1941, your Petitioner was notified of an 
assessment on the basis aforesaid in the sum of $71.94. 
Sixth.· That at no time has your petitioner held any bond, 
note or other evidence of indebtedness of F. S. Royster Guano 
Company to her on account of said credit balance, except a 
written notification to her when dividends were placed to her 
credit, a ty~)ical example of which is as follows: 
Norfolk, Va., .......... 19 ... . 
Mrs. Mary R. White 
In Account With F. S. Royster Guano Co. 
We credit your account with : 
Dividend on .............. shares at$ ....... . 
per share of Preferred Stock of F. S. Royster Guano 
Co., declared .............. , 19. . . . . . $ 
E. & 0. E. 
No regular statements of her account were rendered, though 
such statements were promptly supplied upon re-
page 4 ~quest. There is no written contract or agreemen,t 
existing between Petitioner and F. S. Royster Guano 
Co., merely a verbal understanding that the matter would be 
handled as herein set out. '1,hat your Petitioner is advised and 
therefore alleges that the aforesaid balance is an open account 
· or credit claim against said F. S. Royster Guano Company, and 
that it is not bonds, notes or other evidences of debt within the 
classification set forth in Section· 69 of the .Taw Oode. That if 
said Section 69 should be so construed as imposing a tax of ·5oc 
per $100 on said open account claim it would be void. in that 
it would violate the uniformity provisions of Section 168 of the 
OonstU~tioti of the Oorwmon.wealtli of V11rguii.a and deny to 
your Petitioner the equal protection of the law in violation of 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, and that your Petitioner is entitled to 
have the aforesaid additional omitted assessment in the sum 
of $71.94 made against her by the Department of Taxation for 
the year 1940 corrected and expunged from the Tax Records. 
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Seventl1. That acting and pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 407 of the Ta(J} Oode your Petitioner on February 15th., 
1941, deposited in the United States Mail, addressed to the 
Department of Taxation, Richmond, Virginia, a written appli-
cation for a correction and refund of which a copy is hereto 
attached marked "Exhibit A" as a part of this petition and 
that the Department of Taxation has refused to correct and 
expunge said tax from its records. 
Wherefore your Petitioner prays that the aforesaid.omitted 
additional assessment of $7i.94 made against her by the Depart-
ment of Taxation for the year 1940 may be corrected· and ex-
punged from the Tax Records and that your Petitioner may 
have such other and further relief as may be proper in the 
premises. 
, .. 
MARY R. WHITE 
By F. D. G. RIBBLE 
WILLIAM H. WHITE, JR. 
Her Attorneys. 
Office and · Post Office Address : 
Clark Hall, University, Va. 
page 5 } Service ~f a copy of the fore~oing r>etition upon 
the State Tax Commissioner on this 26 day of June, 
1941 is hereby aclmowledged by the undersigned, who has been 
designated by said Commissioner to defend the same for the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. 
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W. W. MARTIN, 




February 15th 1941~ ·1 




The undersigned hereby makes application pursuant to pro-
visions of Section 407 of the Ta(J} Oode for the correction of the 
omitted assessment made against her by the Department on 
February 14, 1941. 
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Page and 
Line 
Subject of Value 
Taxation 
Taxes Total 
Assessed Amount Due 
1940 123-1 Bonds Etc. 23 980 $119.90 
Credit tax on above assessed as money 47.96 71.94 
MARY R. WHITE 
By WILLIAAM H. WHITE, JR. 
Her Attorney 
W/r 
Filed this 2 day of Aug. 1941. 
EV AW. MAUPIN, Clerk. 
page 7 ~ VIRGINIA: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBE;MARLE COUNTY. 
MARY R. WHITE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Petitioner 
vs. Stipulation of Facts 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ..... ~ ...... Defendant 
It is hereby stipulated and ag-reed l1y and between the attor-
neys for the petitioner and the Commonwealth of Virginia that 
the following are the facts upon which the rights of the parties 
are to be determined : 
1. Petitioner is now, and has been since 1937, a resident of 
Albemarle County in the State of Virginia. Prior to becoming 
a resident of Albemarle County petitioner was for a number 
of years a resident of t~e City of Norfolk, Virginia. 
2. That during t11e times mentioned in the said petition 
and at this time petitioner . was and is a stockholder in t4e 
~oproration known as F. S. Royster Guano Company (herein-: 
after referred to as the company), a corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Virginia, having its 
principal office in the City of Norfolk, Virginia. The Compa:q,i 
is now and has for many years past been engaged in the manu-
facture and sale of chemicals and chemical fertilizers, but is 
not authorized by its charter to do, and never has done, a 
banking business. 
3. It is now and has been for some years. past the custom 
of the company to allow its stockholders who desire to do so 
to leave with the company all or a part of their dividends from 
I H Suprrme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
stock of· the company, up9n which the company would pay the 
same rate of interest on its average monthly indebtedness to 
such stockholders that it would pay to banks from which it 
borrowed money. The company paid to petitioner 
page 8 ~and others similarly situated, during the year 1939 
interest at the rate of one and one-half per centum 
on such average monthly indebtedness. The rate of interest paid 
to petitione1· and others similarly situated, on such average 
monthly indebtedness varies, in · some years amounting to as 
much as four and one-half per centum. In the years ( 1933 and 
1935) when the company borrowed no money from banks no_ 
interest was })aid on the indebtedness of the company to its 
stockholders. There is no written agreement with those who 
desire to leave their dividends or· any part thereof with the 
company, but an oral agreement between the stockholders and 
the company that such stockholders will be paid interest as 
above indicated and that all or any part of the indebtedness of 
the company to such stockholders may be withdrawn at any 
time. 
4. The company was at all of the times mentioned in the 
petition and is now solvent and is ready, willing and able to 
pay to the petitioner aud all others of its stockholders upon 
request all or any part of the indebtedness of the company to 
such stockholders. 
5. On January 1, 1940, the indebtedness of the company 
to petitioner as disclosed by the books of the company, wa.s 
$23,980.11 said indebtedness representing dividends left with 
the company by petitioner. The statement hereto annexed, 
marked "Exhibit A," and made a part of this stipulation, rep-
resents a true and correct statement of petitioner's transactions 
with the company for a period shown therein, which statement· 
was sent to the petitione1• by the company through the medium 
of the Unit~d States mail and was received by her some time 
after January 1, 1940. 
6. Petitioner duly filed with the Director of Finance of 
Albemarle County on or prior to el une 1, 1940, her State tax 
return of intangible p~rsonal property on ''Form 
page 9 ~750, Department of Taxation," and under that por-
tion of the return entitled "Money" ( section 70 of 
the Ta::c Code of Virginia) petitioner returned the a:p1.ount 
which she had on deposit in banks and returned the indebted .. 
ness of the company to her as of January 1, 1940, in the follow~ 
ing words and figures, to-wit: "On deposit with F. S. Royster 
Company, Norfolk, Virginia, and returned under this head 
under authority of Oom,rnonwealth v. Stririgf ello·w 173 Va. 284 
$23,980.11." Thereafter the said indebtedness of the company 
to petitioner was assessed for taxation by the Director of 
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Finance of Albemarle County at the rate of 20 cents on every 
hundred dollars thereof and on October 10, 1940, petitioner 
paid the taxes assessed thereon, together with other taxes, to 
H. A. Haden, Director of Finance of Albemarle County, Vir-
ginia. 
The Company was indebted to. petitioner on account of 
dividends left with the company by petitioner on January· 1, 
1939, amounting to $22,194.09, but petitioner did not report 
such indebtedness for State taxation in 1939, on her return of 
intangible personal property ( Form 750, Department of Taxa-
tion) filed with the Director of Ji,inance of Albemarle County 
either as money under section 70 of the Ta{/} Code of Virginia 
or as bonds, notes and other evidences of debt, demands or 
claims under section 69 of the Ta{/} Code, nor has petitioner 
been assessed with State taxes on account of such indebtedness 
for 1939. The Company was not indebted to petitioner on 
account of dividends left with the company on January 1, of 
any year for the ten years next preceding January 1, 1939. 
7. As soon as practicable after petitioner's return of in-
tangible personal property have been sent to the State Depart-
ment of Taxation by the Director of Ji.,inance of Albemarle 
County as provided in section 84 of the Ta{/} Code of Vvrgvn,itt, 
the said department in regular course of audit, as 
page 10 ~further provided in said Section of the Tax Code, 
on January 4, 1941, advised the petitioner that the 
indebtedness of the company to her as of January 1, 1940, has 
been erroneously returned by her as "money" and that said 
indebtedness should have been returned as "bonds, notes and 
other evidences of debt, etc." under section 69 of the Ta{/} Code 
of Virginia, and under date of February 14, 1941, petitioner 
was notified of an additional assessment on the latter basis in 
· the sum of $71.94, but said additional assessment has not been 
paid by petitioner. 
Acting 1mrsuant to the provisions of section 407 of the Taa: 
Code of Virginia, petitioner on Ji,ebruary 15, 1941, mailed to 
the Department of Taxation a written application for a correc-
tion of said additional assessment, a correct copy of which 
was attached to the petition filed herein, and the Department 
of Taxation has refused to correct and expunge said additional 
assessment from its records. 
8. According to the agreement between petitioner and the 
company, petitioner could and did, when she desired to with-
draw a part of the indebtedness of the company to her, notify 
the company, whereupon, a check of the company was promptly 
sent to her for the amount requested or upon her request a 
check or checks deducted from the indebtedness of the company 
to petitioner-Debit items shown on the attached statement 
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(Exhibit A) represent checks sent to the petitioner or to others 
by the company at petitioner's request. The entire indebtedness 
of the company to petitioner on January 1, 1939, and January 
1, 1940, consisted of dividends left by petitioner :with the com-
pany, and petitioner has never made any deposit of money or 
checks or in any other for:ui with the company, nor has peti-
tioner ever drawn any checks on the company. 
page 11 } 9. At no time has petitioner held any note or 
bond or other. evidences of indebtedness of the com-
pany to her other than statements of the company sent to her 
similar to Exhibit A hereof, and written notifications to her 
when dividends of the company were declared and placed to 
her credit, a typical example of such notification being sent out 
in numbered paragraph 6 of the petition, such written notifica-
tions being retained by petitioner and in her possession at all 
times. No regular statements of petitioner's account were 
rendered by the company, but such statements were promptly 
. supplied upon her request. 
10. The State Tax Commissioner, as the chief executive 
officer of the Department of Taxation, has uniformly ruled 
since he was appointed to this office in 1926, that an indebted-
ness of a corporation to its officers or stockholders, such as is 
described in this stipulation, is subject to State taxation under 
section 69 of the Ta{l) Gode of Virgi,nia, and wherever the Com· 
missioner has had or secured information concerning the exis-
tence of such indebtedness, if it has not been so reported for 
taxation, the Commissioner has caused the said indebtedness 
to be assessed for taxation under the said section 69 of the 
Ta{l) Oode. The said Commissioner personally considered and 
directed to be made the assessment involved in this proceeding. 
Neither the said Commissioner nor any of the employees of the 
Department of Taxation had any knowledge of the indebtedness 
of the company to petitioner prior to the examination and 
audit of the return of intangible personal property filed by 
petitioner in 1940, since the indebtedness of the company to 
petitioner as of January 1, 1939, had not been reported for 
state taxation in any form. Since the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia in 001nmonwealth v. -Stringfellow, 
173 Va. 284, the State Tax Commissioner has ruled that credit 
balances owed by stock brokers to their customers on January 
1 of any year are taxable to such customers under section 70 of 
the Ta:c Oode of Vu-ginia. 
page 12 ~ 11. If the indebtedness of the company to peti-
. tioner as heretofore described as of January 1, 1940, 
is subject· to State taxation under section 69 of the Ta(/) Oode of ; 
Virginia, then the additional assessment of the Department of 'i 
Taxation was duly and regularly made in accordance with the l 
l 
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applicable·provisions of the Tax Code of Virginia and is in the 
proper amount. 
WILLIAM H. WHITE, JR. 
F. D. G. RIBBLE 
Attorneys for petitioner. 
W.W. MARTIN 
Attorney for defendant. 
page 13 } Norfolk, Virginia. 
December 31, 1939. 
Mrs. Mary R. White 
( Transactions for year 1939) 
In Account With F. S. Royster Duano Co. 
1939 CREDITS Dr. 
Jan. 3 By check fro myou ( Returning 
balance of 12/31/38 sent you by 
us as of that date-balance 
1/31/39 ... ·-· .............. . 
Jan. 11 By Dividend ............... . 
July 14 Dy Dividend ............... . 
DEBITS 
March 7-To Cash ( check) ........... $ 2,000.00 
April 13 To Cash (check) . . . . . . . . . . . 4,300.00 
May 6 To Cash (check) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,000.00 
June 15 To Cash ( check) . . . . . . . . . . . 3,950.00 
Aug. 17 To Cash ( check to C. L. Lewis) 8,968.54 
Aug. 17 To Cash ( ~heck to Marshall 
Wells) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 100.00 
Aug. 30 -To Cash ( check to Bailey & 
Hastings Corp.) . . . . . . . . . . . . 665.54 
Aug. 30 To Cash ( check to Sou. Desk 
Co.) ............. : ........ '. 1,550.00 
Sept. 19 To Cash ( check) . . . . . . . . . . . 5,000.00 
Dec. 31 By Interest at 1%% averabe 
balances during year ........ . 
Dec. 31 ~y Balance to your credit 








Jan. 1 By Balance to your ·credit brought ford. $23,980.11 
20 Supreme Court of Ap1)eals of Virginia 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Filed this 6th day of Nov. 1941. 
EV A W. MAUPIN, Clerk. 
page 15 } VIRGINIA: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY, 
January 2, 1942. · 
MARY R. WHITE ....................... ·• .. Petitioner 
vs. ORDER 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ............ Defendant 
This day this cause· came on to be heard by agreement of 
counsel upon the petition filed herein, the stipulation of facts 
entered into by counsel for the respective parties together with 
the exhibits filed therewith, and the argument of counsel; and 
the court doth certify the following : that the petition was 
defended by counsel designated by the State Tax Commissioner 
for the purpose ; that the facts proved are as stated in the 
stipulation of facts entered into by counsel for the respective 
parties together with the exhibits filed therewith, which sti-
pulation and exhibits are hereby made a part of the record 
herein; and that tlie assessment complained of was not caused 
by the wilfull failure or refusal of the J)etitioner to furnish a 
list of her property to the tax assessing authorities as required 
by law. 
Upon consideration whereof, for reasons stated in a memo-
randum opinion in the form of a letter dated.December 16, 1941, 
addressed to counsel for both parties, which memorandum 
opinion is likewise made a part of the record herein, the court 
being of opinion that the petitioner has been erroneously assess-
ed with State taxes and is entitled to the relief prayed for in 
the petition, it is therefore, 
ORDERED that the p~titioner be and she is hereby exoner-
ated from the payment of the full amount of the assessment of 
the State tax of $71.94 for the tax year 1940 as assessed by the 
State Department of Taxation under section 69 of 
page 15 }the Tam Code of Virgvnia and as further described in 
the petition and the stipulation of facts filed .here-
in, and that said assessment be and the same is hereby abated 
and cancelled, and that the clerk of this court shall forthwith l 
certify a copy of this order to the State Tax Commissioner and 
to the State Comptroller. · / 
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To which order of the court the Commonwealth of Virginia 
by counsel excepted and prayed that its exception be noted of 
record, .which is accordingly done. 
(Signed) LlJMUEL F. SMITH, Judge. 
L. 0. B. 51 
P 311 
EV A W. MAUPIN, Clerk. 
page 16 ~·VIRGINIA: 
IN THE CLERK'S OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
ALBEMARLE COUNTY, April 2nd, 1942. 
I, Eva W. Maupin, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the County 
of Albemarle Virginia, hereby certify that the foregoing is a 
true, accurate and complete transcript of the record in this 
proceeding pending in the aforesaid court under the style of 
MARY R. WHITE ............................ Petitioner 
v. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ............ Defendant 
as appears on file and of record in my office aforesaid and which, 
I, as Clerk of said court, have been requested by counsel -for 
said defendant to copy for the purpose of its presentation, along 
with a petition for a writ of error to the judgment of the Court 
in this case, to tl1e Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
And I further certify that it affirmatively appears from the 
papers filed in said action that counsel of record for the plain-
tiff had due written notice of the intention of said defendant 
to apply for the foregoing transcript of record. 
EV A W. MAUPIN, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
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